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Abstract  
This paper investigates three dimensions of overeducation: incidence, impact on earnings and possible determinants. 
The analysis focuses on Italian graduates and refers to the cohort that graduated in 2007 using data from the 
AlmaLaurea survey on graduates' career paths. A new measure of overeducation is introduced and it is jointly 
examined along with other pre-existing measures based on workers' self-assessment. The analysis is carried out by 
comparing the different results obtained adopting the two different measures of overeducation. Results show that the 
newly introduced measure can deal with the biases affecting workers' self- assessment measures. 
JEL: I2, J31 
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Introduction  
Overeducated workers are basically individuals endowed with educational attainments, were 
they knowledge, competences or skills, in excess of what is actually needed or required to 
perform tasks associated with their current job. The economic literature on overeducation starts 
with Freeman (1976) as an aggregate study on decreasing returns to education investments, 
proxied by the average college premium paid to graduate workers in American labour markets. 
In this view, public and private overinvestments in education result in lower levels of returns 
due to the fact that the supply of highly qualified labour is outpacing its relative demand and 
causing a depreciation of college premiums. At a micro level, overeducation is interpreted as a 
source of inequality among peers, such as workers with the same educational levels but earning 
different wages once employed in differently demanding jobs (Frank, 1978; Berg, 1970). 
Duncan and Hoffman (1981) implement an extended version of the Mincerian equation in order 
to estimate separately the effects on wages of required, surplus or deficit years of schooling and 
kick-start the overeducation literature, a popular and much debated economic subfield lying in 
between labour economics and the economics of education. At the operational level, measuring 
overeducation  consists in the assessment of the gap between the required and the attained years 
of schooling for each individual in a given sample. However, while it is quite easy to assess 
employees’ education with a simple question, measuring what employers are effectively 
demanding has proved to be slightly more complicated, dividing most of the contributions to 
the debate between supporters of workers’ self-assessment (WA) or job analysis (JA) measures.  
In this paper we contribute to this debate by introducing a new JA measure based on the Italian 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC(HE) built by Cattani et al. (2014) and applying it to 
Italian graduates interviewed after five years from the degree. Our purpose is to determine the 
incidence, determinants and impact on earnings of overeducation by using this new JA measure 
and iterate the same analysis utilizing an alternative WA measure in order to compare the two 
different outcomes.  
In this respect, the Italian context represents an interesting case study. In early 2000s Italy has 
experienced a sudden increase in the number of graduates due to the participation expansion in 
tertiary education and to the implementation of the so-called “3+2” system1. This expansion 
combined with the dramatic recession that hit the country in the 2008-2012 period, has raised 
                                                           
1
 The reform was termed “3+2” and represented the implementation of the so-called “Bologna process” 
being it based onto a two-cycles degree structure: a first-level  three-year undergraduate course plus a 
second-level two-years master’s degree. Few programs maintained their five/six-year single-cycle 
structure.  
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growing concerns for a proper employability of the Italian graduates and for the wage penalty 
associated with overeducation. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Paragraph 1 introduces some theoretical issues together 
with the most relevant measurement issues, paragraph 2 presents the new measurement of 
overeducation adopted in the paper, paragraphs 3 and 4 describe the estimation methodology 
along with the dataset, paragraphs 5 and 6 present and discuss estimates concerning 
determinants of overeducation and its impact on wages. Paragraph 7 concludes. 
 
1. Theoretical framework(s) – Labour market theories 
There are no generally accepted theories of overeducation, its determinants and its effects on 
wages although a good number of applied studies has tried to relate it to the main labour market 
theories. The most adopted model in such studies was first proposed by Duncan and Hoffman 
in 1981 as an extension of the Mincerian equation, relating wage differentials to attained years 
of schooling now decomposed in required, excess and deficit ones. Although this peculiar 
model was developed starting from a typical human capital framework, it can be placed in a 
theoretical middle ground between human capital theory and institutional theories as it allows 
to test their different hypothesis. Before discussing measurement issues, it could be salutary to 
remember such hypothesis. 
 
a. Human capital theory 
Becker (1964) suggests that wages are only determined by and equal to workers’ marginal 
productivity in turn influenced by their human capital level, however accumulated. In fact, 
there is no distinction between formal education and on-the-job training and firms will 
adequately adapt production processes in order to fully utilize the supply of qualified labour. 
This assumption has a perfect formalization in Mincer’s (1974) equation where the logarithm 
of wages ( ) equals attained years of schooling plus working experience.  
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Where  is the number of attained years of school and  is a vector of controls including 
years of working experience and experience squared. By disaggregating attained schooling into 
required ( ), surplus ( ) and deficit ( ) years it is assumed that not all of them will result in 
the same wage differentials, which is in contradiction with the postulated identity between 
human capital, marginal productivity and wages. 
 
 
 
Broadly speaking, if there is no correspondence between workers’ marginal productivity and 
wages, productivity levels will be attached to job characteristics rather than to individual ones, 
making overeducation inconsistent with the human capital perspective. Imposing in the Duncan 
and Hoffman specification equal returns to all schooling years it can be tested whether human 
capital theory fits data or not: 
 
 
 
However, there is a number of objections to the postulated inconsistence of overeducation with 
the human capital view that it is worth reporting. First, if overeducation is only a transitory 
phenomenon, it can be still consistent with HC theory: in the short run firms can face some 
problems in adapting their production processes to take full advantage of their human capital. 
Frictions and constraints can lead to transitory disequilibria affecting the supply side as well: as 
we discuss more in depth in subparagraph 1.1, the search theory and the career mobility theory 
support the idea that skilled workers may accept unskilled jobs if these last let them free to 
engage in job search (Gautier, 2002; Hornstein et al., 2006; Dolado et al., 2009) or promise 
them higher promotion probabilities (Sicherman and Galor, 1990). Unfortunately, all of these 
theories are at odds with the observed persistency of overeducation for many individuals 
(Sicherman, 1991). Secondly, workers could lack of working experience and thus being 
properly matched once they acquire it. This is consistent with Becker’s assertion on the 
substitutability between formal and informal human capital: workers with less experience have 
less (informal) human capital as they haven’t had the chance to accumulate it with on-the-job 
training. Thus, they are not actually overeducated and are paid exactly their marginal 
productivity (Sicherman, 1991; Kiker et al, 1997). However, little evidence supports the idea 
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that formal education and informal training are treated as substitutes by employers (Duncan and 
Hoffman, 1981; Groot, 1993) and, moreover, overeducated workers still suffer significant wage 
penalties after having controlled for training and experience (Ramirez, 1993; Dolton and 
Vignoles, 2000; McGuinness, 2003; McGuinness, 2006). Finally, human capital measures can 
fail to capture all individual abilities, namely workers’ skills heterogeneity. Thus, 
overeducation can be interpreted, according to heterogeneous skills theory, as a lack of controls 
in Mincerian equation resulting in, at best, omitted variable biases where the omitted variable is 
unobservable ability (Chevalier, 2003). 
 
b. Job competition model 
Institutional theories suggest that wage levels are only related to job characteristics, while 
hiring processes are carried out in a lack of information that forces firms to require formal 
qualifications to minimize expected training costs (Thurow, 1975; 1979). In the human capital 
perspective investments in education affect wages through marginal productivity while labour 
oversupply always leads to lower wages because unemployed individuals compete among 
themselves lowering their requests. In the job competition model workers compete in the hiring 
process to obtain a particular job. Labour oversupply leads workers to queue up on the basis of 
their expected trainability and not to lower their wages. In this model, labour demand and 
labour supply are not independent one each other and the supply of skilled labour depends on 
its relative demand. In fact, workers cannot affect their wages and will invest in education to 
minimize training costs for the possible employers: this is possibly the best framework to 
explain overinvestments in education and thus overeducation. Frictions on both sides of the 
labour market can lead to mismatches while individuals are engaged in increasing educational 
attainments in their attempt to avoid unemployment. Similar assumptions are shared by the 
signalling theory (Spence, 1973), where education still plays a major role in shaping jobs 
allocation among workers. Given that only required education affects wage levels, it is 
relatively straightforward to test in the Duncan and Hoffman extended equation whether excess 
and deficit years of schooling are not significantly different from zero: 
 
( ) 
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c. Assignment theory 
Placed in a theoretical middle ground between human capital and job competition models, the 
assignment theory proposed by Sattinger (1993) states that both demand and supply factors 
affect wage levels. On the one hand, qualifications and education levels drive allocating 
processes like in the job competition model. On the other hand, workers will not be randomly 
assigned to jobs as investments in education are driven by income maximization. In fact, wages 
are determined by job characteristics and those workers who are willing to obtain better (and 
better paid) jobs will increasingly accumulate skills, knowledge and qualifications to win the 
competition. Individual characteristics will also play a role in job allocation and thus in 
earnings distribution. Hence, wages are not entirely determined by job requirements and a 
straightforward way to test assignment theory is to impose the restriction proposed by 
McGuinnes (2006): . 
Several works on the topic adopt a different model specification, first proposed by Verdugo and 
Verdugo (1989), which employs dummy variables to capture the effects on earnings of over 
and under education. This is the specification we use in this paper and there are three notes we 
should unavoidably mention before continuing to other theoretical issues. First, as we will 
argue more in depth in paragraph 3, coefficients associated with these dummy variables do not 
estimate the impact on earnings of an additional year of education but the fact itself that a 
worker is over or under educated. Second, dummy variables are especially useful when 
analysing samples or populations composed by graduates only, where individuals can be only 
matched or overeducated. This is exactly how our sample is defined and our study should 
therefore be benchmarked against similar graduates’ labour markets analyses, particularly 
popular in Europe and UK (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Allen and Van der Velden, 2001; 
Green, McIntosh and Vignoles, 2002; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Dolton and Silles, 2008; 
Green and Zhu, 2010 and many others). Third, if regressors cannot be interpreted as returns to 
schooling years but just as differences among different employment realizations, it is 
impossible to test which labour market theory fits best our data. With respect to this last issue, 
there is to be said that tests presented in this section are taken by McGuinness (2006) and 
Hartog (2000) and are not necessarily to be taken for granted. In fact, once assessed that the 
three coefficients are different it is impossible to reject in a neat way the human capital theory 
because of the three mentioned objections to the inconsistence of overeducation with this 
theory. Furthermore, Thurow’s job competition model is not necessarily unfit to explain results 
with returns to excess and deficit years different from zero as in this model wages are not 
deterministically determined solely by demand side factors and their relationship with 
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educational attainments, which are supply side factors by definition, is indirect. Notably, these 
restrictions intended to test the human capital theory and the job competition model have 
always been rejected by data (Hartog, 2000; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). Finally, the 
proposed test for the assignment theory could be questioned and labelled as residual with 
respect to the former two.  
 
1.1 Theoretical framework – Determinants 
Estimating returns to education with separate information on required, exceeding and deficit 
years of schooling is only useful when Freeman’s view is adopted: overeducation is due to an 
oversupply of qualified labour at an aggregate level that calls in turn for policies intended to 
stimulate its demand or limit its formation. However, no sufficient empirical evidences have 
been brought in support to Freeman’s interpretation: were wages only determined by market 
forces, we should then expect a relative depreciation of skilled professions against non-skilled 
ones. However, recent analyses report substantial relative gains for graduate workers (Machin, 
1999; Dearden et al., 2002). It is not clear, moreover, to what extent overeducation is related to  
macro dimensions, such as business cycles (Rubb, 2003), and surveys of the UK business 
community on job vacancies and skills deficiencies report, even at times of cyclical upswing, 
recruitment difficulties (see Campbell et al., 2001). It is hard to assess these relationship 
without discussing and testing potential determinants of overeducation. Furthermore, assuming 
that overeducation is a matter of private investments that affects only a given proportion of 
workers because of their individual characteristics, brings us to the same conclusions. In fact, 
no information concerning returns to required, surplus or deficit years will be capable to affect 
individual investments in education and training without a clear and reliable tool to predict who 
will be matched, overeducated and undereducated. Strategies to achieve this goal include 
measuring the incidence of overeducation for different categories of workers, estimating 
distribution function models to assess different probabilities to be overschooled as driven by 
individual characteristics and assessing differential wage-effects for such characteristics.  
 
a. Differential overeducation 
Women tend to show a higher probability to be overeducated in almost all studies on the topic. 
Frank (1978) measures its incidence controlling by gender and theorizes that married women 
can be heavily constrained in their quest for an appropriate job by the location of their families 
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in case this is based on their men’s career needs. Sloane et al. (1999) explain similar findings 
otherwise, suggesting that part-time workers are more likely to be overeducated and women 
with young children are more likely to accept part-time jobs. All in all, gender is considered to 
be heavily affected by supply side rigidities such as time and mobility constraints in skilled 
labour markets, including a lower propensity to commuting for married women and families 
with children (McGoldrick and Robst, 1996; Green et al., 2002; Buchel and Van Ham, 2003; 
Buchel and Battu, 2003). Ethnicity can play a similar role in increasing such rigidities as 
immigrants can be limited in commuting or less proficient in the host country language and 
thus experience difficulties in finding jobs that are appropriate to their educational titles, once 
these have been recognized or achieved in place (Green et al., 2007; Battu et al., 2004). 
Additional sources of differential overeducation can be identified in workers’ social 
background and the contractual basis. In fact, education can have a consumption value for 
richer families whose children may be driven to attend more years of schooling than those 
suggested by their potential role of human capital investments (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). 
On the contrary, richer families and graduates with graduated parents can benefit of a larger 
number of opportunities and acquaintances when looking for a proper job. The contractual 
basis can affect individuals’ capability to learn on the job and gain field experience and, for 
subjective measures (WA) heavily affect workers’ perception when asked to state whether they 
are matched or overeducated. 
 
b. Age and work experience 
Skilled labour mismatches can be just a temporary phenomenon and tend to disappear as young 
graduates’ careers evolve gaining field experience. At least two theories are based on this 
assumption, the search theory and the career mobility theory. According to the former, highly 
qualified workers can accept jobs for which they are overeducated but highly productive or 
rewarded and allowed to engage in on-the-job search to obtain a better job, resulting in 
progressively better matches (Gautier, 2002; Hornstein et al., 2006; Dolado et al., 2009). 
According to the latter one, developed by Sicherman and Galor (1990), graduates may accept 
jobs with lower educational requirements associated with lower wages but with higher 
probabilities to be promoted. Many works support the idea that overeducation is only transitory 
and due to a lack of experience (Dolton and Vignoles, 1997; Sloane et al., 1999; Kiker et al., 
2000) but applied studies show difficulties in testing such hypothesis. Moreover, a huge 
amount of structural overeducated workers that never switch their statuses, reported by the 
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same authors that supported this view clearly tackles its explanatory potential (Sicherman, 
1991; Dolton and Vignoles, 1997; Sloane et al., 1999; Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Rubb, 
2003). In conclusion, negative relationships between age and the probability to be overeducated 
has been assessed for all countries and periods and this fact is one of the few constants in this 
economic subfield. Nonetheless, we lack of a clear explanation for this, while evidence 
supports the idea that skills and abilities, more than age, can explain these differentials (Battu et 
al., 1999; Bauer, 2002). Some graduate workers who are overeducated and don’t shift to better 
jobs can, in the end, be less skilled or, alternatively, those who are able to get better jobs could 
have developed further skills on the job thus explaining a new and secondary role played by 
age. 
c. Skills 
Chevalier (2003) builds up a measure to capture the structural overeducated share of workers 
and tries to explain it. He distinguishes between apparent and genuine overeducated applying 
the idea that workers with the same education level not necessarily share the same level of 
skills. He thus defines overeducation as apparent where graduates employed in non-graduate 
jobs don’t state to be dissatisfied with their jobs, proving to share a lower skill level and being 
adequately matched for such jobs. Genuine overeducation, on the contrary, occurs where 
overeducated workers perceive it, reporting a certain degree of dissatisfaction thus signalling 
they have higher skill levels compared to those required by their particular job post. Basically, 
in Chevalier’s view, the distinction between genuine and apparent overeducation is marked by 
job satisfaction. A similar approach is used by Allen and Van der Velden (2001) who 
conceptualize overskilling as the excess skill levels workers are endowed with, not necessarily 
correlated to overeducation. They aren’t interested in the overall job satisfaction and ask 
workers only about skills utilizations. They have the same purpose as Chevalier: explaining 
structural overeducation with an heterogeneity in human capital dimensions not referred to 
formal education such as innate ability. The heterogeneous skills theory states that individuals 
with equal education titles don’t match equally demanding jobs if they’re actually offering 
different skill levels: less skilled graduates, for instance, are matched in non-graduate jobs and 
their overeducation is just apparent (Chevalier, 2003) or formal (Green and Zhu, 2010) if, 
respectively, it doesn’t imply effects on job satisfaction or wage penalties. Skills and abilities 
are considered by the majority of contributions in this field as determinants of overeducation 
and possibly of wage penalties, although assessing this last causal relationship has proved to be 
problematic as we discuss in paragraph 3. All the attempts to measure or capture skills and 
ability levels we have presented so far are proxies based on workers self-assessment (WA). Di 
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Pietro and Urwin (2009) applies this strategy to the Italian case, but there are pros and cons one 
should take into account before relying on such information. On the one hand, in small surveys 
on workers or graduates it is rather simple to ask them directly whether skills acquired via 
higher education are being utilized on the job or not. On the other hand, when elaborating 
already available data on the entire labour force this question may not be included in the 
questionnaire. Moreover, regardless data availability WA is subjective and can bring significant 
biases in the measurement if workers tend to over/under state systematically their job 
requirements. In fact, there is a number of studies based on objective measures for skills and 
ability. Green et al. (2002) test relationships between the possibility to be overeducated and, 
respectively, math marks achieved during the high school and data from the International Adult 
Literacy Survey (IALS). Similar evidence is also found with data from the UK Skills Survey 
(Green and McIntosh, 2007). Hartog et al. (1996) report a negative relation between 
quantitative literacy and underschooling and a weak but positive relation between this last one 
and IQs (Hartog and Jonker, 1996). Ability has been also proxied by high school final marks 
(Buchel and Pollmann-Schult, 2001) while a certain degree of diversity in the probability to be 
overeducated can be explained by the type of skills imparted via education, such as the 
disciplinary field (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000).  
 
1.2 The different approaches to the measurement of overeducation 
Individual characteristics, anyhow measured, represent the supply side of the human capital 
matching in the labour markets. Measuring workers’ titles and skills is thus just half of the 
work one should accomplish in order to assess overeducation incidence and wage effects. 
Education and skill levels demanded by employers are, in fact, the benchmark to which we 
have to refer individual endowments of human capital in order to understand who is  matched, 
who has deficit and who has excess schooling. We discuss in this paragraph the three main 
methods adopted in the economic literature to proxy for job requirements. 
a. Worker self-assessment (WA) 
The first and most utilized strategy to measure job requirements is to directly ask workers what 
is required or needed to obtain or carry out the job. Duncan and Hoffman (1981) along with 
others (Hartog and Tsang, 1987; Sicherman, 1991) refer to the formal education required to 
obtain the job, while Ramirez (1993) refers to the informal education needed to perform the 
job. These are quite different things to analyse, being the former referred to hiring standards 
and the latter to the cognitive content encompassed in the assigned tasks. Nonetheless, WA is 
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not available for most labour force surveys and it is subjective, given that it only reflects the 
worker’s point of view. This fact can bring to biases as workers tend to overstate their job 
requirements to inflate their job position during the interview or, in newly hired workers, reflect 
qualification inflation in firms’ hiring strategies (Hartog, 2000). In our view, a subjective 
measure of job requirements can be affected also by workers’ job satisfaction including 
economic rewards for their educational titles. Individuals can perceive their job as inadequate 
to their educational level, in fact, basing their evaluation on poor college wage premiums even 
if the cognitive content of the assigned tasks is in line with their studies. 
b. Job-analysis (JA) 
This measurement is obtained by looking at information provided in the occupational 
classifications and thus building a correspondence table that assigns an educational level to 
each job title. Many works adopt this strategy (Eckaus, 1964; Thurow and Lucas, 1972; Hartog, 
1980; Rumberger, 1987; Kiker and Santos, 1991; Oosterbeek and Webbink, 1996) referring to 
the General Educational Development (GED) taxonomy or the Dictionary of Occupation Titles 
(DOT). Unfortunately, this measurement hasn’t gain much popularity as classifications are 
rarely updated because updates are costly (Mason, 1996; Hartog, 2000) and there is no 
consensus when converting occupational scales into schooling years (Halaby, 1994). 
c. Realized matches.   
One may also look at market realizations such as the mean educational attainment in a given 
occupation or as hiring standards used by firms’ personnel departments (Verdugo and Verdugo, 
1989; Groot and Maassen van der Brink, 1997; Groenveld and Hartog, 2004). Unfortunately, 
these matches are the result of demand and supply forces and don’t reflect only job 
requirements (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). 
 
2 The new measurement of overeducation adopted in the paper 
In this study we try to address the job requirements measurement error problem highlighted in 
the above mentioned literature (Hartog, 2000; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011) by adopting a 
mixed method of measurement. In fact, we infer employers’ job requirements from Italian 
occupational classification (CP 2006) after having attached to each job title its European 
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Qualification Framework (EQF)2 corresponding level as identified by Cattani et al. (2014). In 
his application to Italian labour force of the Warwick IER’s SOC(HE) classification, the 
allocation of job titles to major groups (Experts, Strategists, Communicators and Non-graduate-
jobs) is based on data from the Istat survey on Italian professions (2009) in which 16,000 
workers are asked to assign a score (1-100) to 109 variables referred to the O*Net3 taxonomy 
for knowledge, skills and competences. These variables are grouped into the three categories of 
SOC(HE): experts, strategists and communicators. Following Istat-Isfol methodology, Cattani 
et al. (2014) assigns a difficulty score to each group of variables for each job title4. This score is 
then translated into an equivalent 1-8 scale EQF score. The highest score of the three groups is 
then adopted as the job title’s EQF level. This is particularly useful as the translation from 
occupational classifications into schooling years still lacks an adequate level of consensus 
among economists and EQF provides us with a correspondence table which is, at least, 
accepted by all European governments and their statistical offices.  
< Insert Table 1 here> 
Following this methodology, economists are, for instance, assigned to Experts major group 
while their EQF level is 7, equivalent to the Italian master degree (18 schooling years). 
< Insert Table 2 here> 
                                                           
2
 The European Qualification Framework (EQF) is a common transnational translation device for all 
European qualifications. Qualifications are here defined as educational titles issued at the completion of 
an educational or training process. The aim of the EQF (issued by the European Commission in 2008) is 
to make different national qualifications more readable across the continent and “promoting workers' and 
learners' mobility between countries and facilitating their lifelong learning” (Recommendation 
111/2008). It relates all European national qualifications to 8 major levels, referring to knowledge, skills 
and competences acquired in their relative education/training process. In our study, this is of crucial 
importance given the univocal translation from Italian qualifications into EQF levels letting room for a 
univocal translation of EQF levels into schooling years. 
3
 O*Net (Occupational Information Network) is an American data collection and spreading system 
focused on employment, jobs, skills shortages, professional profiles and individual characteristics. It is 
based on the SOC classification and it has been structured to describe tasks and professional profiles 
demanded and supplied enacting work processes. O*Net embodies the advantages of SOC classification 
and its implementation took large account of the indications emerged from the SCAN works, such as the 
distinction within the three types (basic, thinking and personal) of soft skills. It is divided into six 
dimensions: Experience Requirements, Occupation Requirements, Occupation Specific Information, 
Occupation Characteristics, Worker Characteristics and Worker Requirements. This particular structure 
allows the in-depth description of different job profiles and it is fit, thanks to transcode tools, to 
networking by exploiting linkages with other classification systems. 
4 The difficulty index varies in each group of variables between 1 and 100 and is calculated as the 
average score of variables selected case by case for each job title. The selection of variables in each 
group however is not subjective and it is based on the standard deviation rule: for each job title Cattani et 
al. (2014) selected those variables exceeding the mean of all variables in the grouping (experts, 
strategists or communicators) incremented by the value of the standard deviation. Knowledge, skills and 
competences selected in this way are the ones needed to carry out the most characterizing tasks of the 
profession. 
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This job requirement measure shares with JA measures the advantage of avoiding biases driven 
by WA. In fact, the employers’ point of view is represented by educational requirements stated 
by workers without including the job satisfaction dimension and their subjective job position 
assessment. Interviews in the Istat survey are carried out referring explicitly only to skills, 
knowledge and competences utilization on the job place without mentioning job positions. 
Moreover, workers are sampled and selected on the basis of the position they hold in the firm 
and there is no room for them to overstate it. Finally, workers interviewed in Istat survey are 
not the same ones we observe in our model. Our study on overeducation is based on 
AlmaLaurea data on Italian graduates as described in paragraph 3 and their individual point of 
view is completely neglected when considering job requirements.  
The described methodology allows Istat-Isfol5 to attach to each job title an objective degree of 
skills utilizations on which we build our measure that captures what is actually needed to carry 
out a specific profession in terms of cognitive contents embodied in its constituent tasks. 
SOC(HE)-Italy measure for overeducation comes to be a sort of JA measure expressed in 
schooling years which are in turn determined by EQF framework and therefore granted of a 
certain degree of consensus. However, JA measures are, as noted above, affected also by 
imprecision as they are costly to revise and thus rarely updated. Our measure can be, in other 
words, objective and precise to some extent but limited in time as professions evolve changing 
their typical tasks and their relative cognitive contents. Basing our measure on data from the 
Istat survey on Italian professions partially addresses this problem as this survey is periodically 
held by Istat and thus data availability should not represent a major problem with respect to 
Italy. We do recognize however that such data can be unavailable for many European and 
western countries and in that case our SOC(HE)6 measure for overeducation could be limited 
when trying to extend its application to other national contexts. 
 
3 The estimation methodology 
The basic specification of our model consists in a Duncan and Hoffmann extended wage 
equation as modified by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989), while alternative specifications will be 
obtained by adding controls for observable abilities and family or social background. 
                                                           
5 The Italian Institute for the Development of Vocational Training (Isfol) implemented the methodology 
with which Istat assigned to each job title a corresponding EQF level, working on data from the above 
mentioned survey. This is why in this work we refer to this methodology as Istat, Isfol or Istat/Isfol 
methodology. 
6
 For a complete description of the original SOC(HE) classification see Elias and Purcell (2004; 2011) 
and Purcell et al. (2012). 
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Where  is the dummy variable for overeducation and  is the vector of controls including 
experience, experience squared, gender, working area, field of study and industry and others, 
fully described in paragraph 3.3. The three specifications differ in additional controls that are 
included step by step. In the first specification we include experience, gender, working area, 
tenure, field of study. In the second specification we add (see Tables 11 and 12) abilities related 
variables. In the third and last specification, social and family background proxies are included. 
The model is run onto AlmaLaurea data, referring to a sample of Italian graduates so that 
individuals can only be overeducated or matched. Overeducation here is a dummy variable 
defined by SOC(HE)-Italy, where D=1 if the individual is overeducated (employed in job titles 
with EQF Level below or equal to 6), D=0 otherwise. 
It is important to stress that when adopting this specification we compare overeducated workers 
and individuals with the same level of education but employed in adequate jobs. Thus, the sign 
of regressor  is often negative, suggesting that overeducated workers earn less than their 
adequately matched ex schoolmates. This is not exactly what Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) 
suggest. They erroneously interpret this negative sign as a negative return to overschooling in 
opposition to higher and positive returns to required schooling and in contradiction with 
previous empirical evidences of positive although lower returns to excess schooling. This is 
actually a misinterpretation as the utilization of dummy variables relates the selected 
individuals in comparison with their direct counterparts: in this case, matched people. Returns 
to overschooling may well be positive even in case their regressor has a negative sign: this just 
means, as noted above, that these returns are lower compared to those earned by matched 
workers (Cohn and Kahn, 1995; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). 
Although highly criticized7, this specification has gained some popularity due to its capacity to 
describe differences among graduates’ entering the labour market. Allen and Van der Velden 
(2001) find for the Netherlands that overeducated graduates earn some 5-10% less than their 
matched former schoolmates while, in the UK, a large literature based on this estimation 
strategy highlights wage penalties as large as 16% associated with overeducation statuses 
(Dolton and Silles, 2008) with significant differences between males and females who suffer 
respectively penalties equal to 10% and 27% (Green, McIntosh and Vignoles, 2002). Similar 
evidence is found by a number of studies for the UK and Northen Ireland (Sloane et al. 1999; 
Sloane, 2003; McGuinness, 2006; Green and McIntosh, 2007; Green and Zhu, 2010 among the 
                                                           
7
 Hartog asserted in the year 2000 its deletion would have benefited to researches in this field. 
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others). Although estimating returns to schooling seems not to be affected by the utilized 
overeducation measurement, overeducation incidence varies a lot: objective measures (JA) are 
significantly lower than subjective (WA) ones (Groot and Maassen van der Brink, 2000; 
McGuinness, 2006; Cedefop, 2010). The total share of the labour force that is affected by 
overeducation increased in the last two decades with little differences between genders, from 
21.7% to 33.2% for men and from 23.8% to 32.1% for women (Green and Zhu, 2010). 
Significant differences can also be found when comparing different European countries, 
reaching a minimum of 14-15% in the Netherlands (Allen and van del Velden, 2001; Groot and 
Maassen van der Brink, 2000) and a maximum of 30-40% in the UK (Green and Zhu, 2010; 
Dolton and Vignoles, 2000). 
However, evidence for Italy is contradictory: Ferrante et al. (2010) find that wages are affected 
by overskilling only and there is no relationship with overeducation. Di Pietro and Urwin 
(2006) estimate a 5.5% wage penalty for those 25.5% of Italian graduates that state to be 
overeducated. 
 
3.1 The analysis of the determinants of overeducation 
As outlined in the previous paragraphs, the new measure of overeducation is dichotomous and, 
therefore, its determinants can be estimated through a straightforward Probit model. Applying 
standard treatment of the Probit model, we have that Overeducation =1 (YES) when a latent 
variable Y is strictly positive, Y>0, and that Overeducation =0 (NO) when Y is nil, Y=0.  
The latent variable is linked through a linear function to a set of statistical variables so that:  
 
Where  is a normally and independently distributed error term (NID) 
Consequently, we have:  
P(Overeducation=1=YES)= P(Y>0)=  
where F is the distribution function for , which in the case of the Probit model is a standard 
normal distribution function.  
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3.2 The analysis of the effects of overeducation on wages 
In order to investigate the effects of both measures of overeducation on the level of wages, one 
cannot simply run a standard OLS to estimate a multivariate regression model in which the 
level of wage depends on a dummy variable indicating overeducation and a set of covariate as 
control variables. As the level of wage cannot be observed for, voluntarily or involuntarily, 
unemployed graduates, a straightforward OLS estimate would contain a sample selection bias, 
which would bias the estimation of the parameters. To overcome this problem, one has to 
model, in a first step, the decision to work. Therefore, following Heckman (1979), one has to 
estimate a system of two equations: 
 
 
 
Of course, W can be observed only if the individual works. The decision to work is moulded by 
a Probit model, which is the second equation of the system: 
 
 
 
The wage can be observed if and only if  and cannot be observed if . The model 
is completed, assuming that the error terms  are normally distributed with variance  
and , respectively, and covariance .  
 
3.3 Dataset and variables.   
The empirical analysis presented in this essay is based on data from the AlmaLaurea dataset on 
Italian graduates. AlmaLaurea is a consortium of Italian Universities aimed at fostering highly 
qualified labour demand and supply matching for graduates, universities and the business 
world. AlmaLaurea collects every year extensive data on the graduates of each cohort and on 
their early working career path. This complex information is gathered in two stages. At the time 
of graduation students fill in a questionnaire providing their personal data and information 
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concerning their social and family background, educational path and performances, intrinsic 
motivation and other subjective features. Then, graduates are interviewed after one, three and 
five years after graduation on their career paths and/or their post-graduate studies. 
In our analysis we refer to the last cohort of graduates whose information is fully available for 
both steps of the survey. This cohort includes individuals graduated in either a two-year 
Master’s degree or a five/six-year university degree (such as Medicine and Law faculties) 
during 2007, who completed their two-step survey in 2012. The relevant population is 
composed by 184.669 graduates in 46 Italian universities, representing 61.5% of the Italian 
graduates in that year8. The subsample of graduates who answered the questionnaire after five 
years from graduation is composed by 31,162 individuals. Since we are only interested 
employed graduates, we exclude all those reporting to be either unemployed or inactive. 
Accordingly, we end up with a final sample of 25,523 graduates reporting to be employed at 
the time of the interview. Due to missing data our descriptive statistics on JA overeducation are 
limited to 18,269 individuals. 
Our main variables of interest are represented by the wage levels and by two dummies that 
capture overeducation in both WA and JA terms. Wages are measured in terms of net monthly 
earning. Our measures of overeducation are based onto two items of the AlmaLaurea 
questionnaire. The JA measure is built on the occupational code, provided at a 5 digit level. 
Individuals are considered matched if their job is included in one of the three ‘graduate-jobs’ 
categories of the newly introduced SOC(HE)-Italy classification, overeducated otherwise. The 
WA measure is based on a specific question for job requirements as reported by respondents. 
However, 5-digit occupational codes are only available in the 5-year after graduation interview. 
Consequently, our empirical analysis is cross-sectional and referred to the 5-year after 
graduation survey, held in 2012.  
Additional variables in the analysis include standard covariates of the human capital model: 
personal characteristics, educational path and achievements (field of study, graduation mark, 
and delay in completing the degree) and employment history (experience, tenure). Individual 
heterogeneity is also captured by data on skills concerning software usage, foreign languages 
and the attainment of a scholarship, which are used as proxies of intrinsic abilities. In addition, 
we include variables related to current job’s characteristics, such as the industrial sector, the 
working region, and the type of contract.  
 
                                                           
8
 Source: our elaborations on  ISTAT data.  
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4. Descriptive statistics.  
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the two measures of overeducation used in our 
empirical analysis. 20.9% of graduates are currently employed in jobs that require an 
undergraduate educational attainment (JA measure), while 26.1% of graduates report to be 
overeducated in their current job (WA measure). However, the two definitions of overeducation 
do not perfectly overlap. On the one side, 71.5% of JA overeducated individuals also perceive 
themselves in such a status. On the other side, only 42.1% of individuals reporting to be 
overeducated are classified as overeducated in JA terms. All in all, both percentages confirm 
that Italy has one of the highest incidence in Europe of overeducated workers five years after 
graduation (Ferrante et al., 2010; Verhaest and Van der Velden, 2010)9. 
< Insert Table 3 here > 
The interaction of wage levels and overeducation with the other variables included in our 
models reveals some interesting findings with respect to both types of overeducated graduates.  
Concerning individual characteristics (Table 4), we find that the gender variable acts in a 
different way according to the measure of overeducation. Women show higher proportions of 
JA overeducation (24.2%) than men (21.4%). Conversely, the share of men that perceive 
themselves as overeducated (28.2%) is higher than the correspondent share of women (24.9%), 
although the gender gap in terms of wage is substantial (504 €). Moreover, women with 
children show higher proportions of WA overeducated (32.7%). Similarly, the share of working 
students reporting to be WA overeducated 5 years after graduation (33.9%) is higher than that 
of full time students, because the former tend not to change job once graduated. Finally, a 
higher social and/or family background is associated with a lower share of overeducated, as 
expected.  
< Insert Table 4 here > 
When reference is made to the field of study (Table 5), the best results in terms of JA matching 
are achieved by sciences, medicine and pedagogy, all of them showing a rate of overeducated 
lower than 10%. On the contrary, economics, statistics, sport sciences, geo-biological 
disciplines, agriculture and architecture show the highest share of JA overeducated (more than 
30%). These results partly differ from those reported by the WA measure, which is higher for 
engineering and political and social sciences, while it is lower for agriculture and architecture.  
                                                           
9
 Notably, the greatest part of the European countries has shares of overeducated workers ranging from 
10% to 15% (Verhaest and Van der Velden, 2010). 
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< Insert Table 5 here > 
The difference between the two measures of overeducation is clearly highlighted by descriptive 
statistics referred to job characteristics (Table 6). In this respect, we analyse the type of contract 
and the working area. In terms of geographical distribution, all Italian macro-regions show 
similar percentages of overeducated (slightly more than 20%). Foreign countries are the only 
working area reporting a substantially lower share of overeducated (17,6%). Italian regions 
differ with respect to workers’ distribution and wages: the majority of respondents works in 
northern Italy, where wages are also substantially higher than in other regions. The highest 
wages, however, are reported by graduates working abroad, who earn on average 2229€. 
Looking at the contractual basis, summary statistics primarily show the heterogeneity of the 
employment relationships and the relatively low diffusion of open-ended contracts (covering 
only half of the sample), which is connected with the short working experience reported by our 
sample (on average 2.8 years out of a five-year period). Then, in terms of both JA and WA 
measures, descriptive statistics show that self-employed workers are less overeducated than 
employees. Additionally, workers on fixed-term and non-standard contracts are less 
overeducated than those with open-ended contracts. The highest shares of overeducated 
graduates (more than 50%) are associated with apprentices and temporary contracts.  
< Insert Table 6 here > 
Finally, overeducation incidence varies greatly even across industries (Table 7). The different 
sectors can be grouped into three clusters identified on the basis of the level of the incidence of 
overeducated graduates. The first one, which shows low levels of overeducation (less than 
20%), includes electronic, education, information technology, health, professional consultancy, 
and other services. The second one, which shows average levels of overeducation in the range 
between 20% and 30%, comprehends printing industry, construction industry, public 
administration, information and communication industry. The last one, reporting high levels of 
overeducation (more than 30%), includes agriculture, energy and mining, manufacture of metal 
products and machineries, wholesale and retail trade, transporting and storage activities, 
financial and insurance activities, arts, entertainment and recreation sector, other 
manufacturing. However, three of those sectors with an incidence of overeducation above 30% 
(manufacture of metal products, other manufacturing, financial and insurance activities) are 
also characterized by wages that, on average, are higher than 1500 €. This evidence confirms 
the relevance of the industry sector as an expected determinant of both JA/WA overeducation 
and wages. 
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< Insert Table 7 here > 
5. The determinants of overeducation  
 
a. The determinants of JA overeducation  
In order to analyse thoroughly the determinants of JA, five different specifications of the same 
model have been taken into account.  
In the first specification (column 1 in Table 8) the relationship between the likelihood to be 
overeducated and the characteristics of the job post have been investigated. Available 
information on job posts includes the industry, the contractual basis and whether the work 
activity is full time or part time. Each sector is identified by a dummy variable; 
IND_OTH_SERV is omitted in the model and therefore selected as benchmark for all other 
industries. An identical procedure has been applied to identify each contractual basis; in this 
case the open-ended employment contract has been chosen as benchmark. The estimates show 
that, with few exceptions, most of the sectors show a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. Consultancy (IND_OTHCONS) and the education sector (IND_EDU_RES) are the 
only exceptions as they show negative and statistically significant coefficients. This result can 
be interpreted as remarkable evidence that JA is spread in most of the sectors of the economic 
system, at least for graduate workers, and is not a phenomenon observable in few well defined 
sectors. As far as the contractual basis is concerned, the evidence is more controversial. Self-
employed and fixed term employment contracts (SELF_EMPL and FIX_CON, respectively) 
affect negatively the probability to be overeducated, whereas the opposite impact on 
overeducation is estimated for non-standard and training contracts (PERM_CON and 
TRAIN_CON, respectively). In addition to sectorial and contractual dummies, the model also 
includes a gender dummy, whose coefficient is negative and statistically significant: males are 
more likely to be overeducated than females. This counterintuitive evidence is in line with 
previous analyses (Franzini and Raitano, 2009) that pointed out how Italy actually represents an 
exception to differential overeducation theories. Finally, it should be observed that full time 
employment relationship has a negative impact on the probability to be overeducated.  
In the second specification (column 2 in Table 8) five dummy variables, each one identifying a 
single macro geographical area, are added. All parameters related to the Italian macro 
geographical areas present a positive sign but these are all statistically not significant. 
Interestingly, only the parameter identifying the foreign macro geographical area 
(AREA_ABR) arises with a statistically significant parameter. In this case the sign is negative, 
which indicates that the likelihood to be over educated is lower for graduates working abroad. 
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Moreover, it is worth noting that in this second specification the estimated parameters 
associated with sectors and contractual basis do not change significantly with respect to the first 
specification.  
In the third specification (column 3 in Table 8) two sets of variables related to the graduates' 
characteristics are added. Unfortunately, due to missing data concerning these variables, the 
number of observations in this model is reduced by over 60%, making any comparison between 
this model and the previous ones problematic. The first set of variables includes information 
concerning graduates’ work experience, postgraduate studies and age. As far as this set of 
variables is concerned, postgraduate studies is the only significant dimension showing a 
negative sign. This result suggests that the probability to be overeducated is higher for 
graduates entering the labour market and decreases with working experience. The second set of 
dummy variables includes the field of study and a dummy variable associated with the 
attainment of a PhD. The parameters for most of the humanities and for law studies and 
medicine show a positive and statistically significant sign, whereas techno-scientific degrees 
such as engineering and chemical-pharmaceutical degrees have negative and statistically 
significant coefficients. Not surprisingly, the parameter for the attainment of a PhD. is positive 
and statistically significant.  
In the fourth specification (column 4 in Table 8) we add few further individual variables such 
as the graduation mark (DEG_MARK), the average mark in university studies (AV_MARK) 
and marks in high school leaving certificates. All these variables can be considered as proxies 
of individual ability. As expected, the estimates for these parameters turn out to be positive and 
statistically significant for the variables concerning the university studies, whereas the 
parameter for the achievement at the secondary school is negative, but statistically non-
significant.  
Finally, the fifth specification (column 5 in Table 8) includes dummy variables for graduates' 
social background. The coefficient of parents' education is negative and statistically significant, 
whereas father's social position is not statistically different from nil.  
< Insert Table 8 here > 
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b. The determinants of WA overeducation  
The analysis on WA overeducation reiterates that with the JA measure, allowing staightforward 
comparisons between the two.  
The results of the first specification (column 1 in Table 9) almost coincide with those obtained 
for JA. First, sectorial dummies show similar results with exception for the parameter 
associated with the health sector, which in this estimate shows a negative and statistically 
significant sign. As far as the contractual basis is concerned, only parasubordinated contracts 
change their effect on the probability to be overeducated, showing a negative and statistically 
significant parameter.  
However, results change significantly in the second specification (column 2 in Table 9), where 
a set of dummy variables identifying macro geographical areas have been included. All areas, 
with the exception of AREA_ISL, show a statistically significant parameter. As observed for 
JA, the parameter for the AREA_ABR is negative, whereas for all the other macro 
geographical area the sign is strictly positive. Overeducation seems to be a widespread 
phenomenon not confined to few specific areas. 
Graduates' individual characteristics are added in the third specification (column 3 in Table 9). 
In this case, comparisons with the estimate run for JA highlight striking differences. 
Postgraduate studies are the ones having a negative impact on the probability to be 
overeducated, while both years of work experience (EXP) and tenure in the current job 
(TENURE) show positive signs. Results are quite different compared to the JA measure 
estimates even when controlling for the field of study. In this case, graduates from STEM 
faculties are not the ones showing a lower propensity to be overeducated as law and medicine 
show negative sign too. Finally, we find differences between WA and JA measures when 
considering the effect of having completed a PhD course.  
Ability proxies are included in the fourth specification (column 4 in Table 9). The variable 
measuring the average mark in university exams is positive and statistically significant as in the 
case for JA; the variable reporting the degree final evaluation is also positive but the statistical 
significance is limited to 10%.  
Finally, the fifth specification (column 5 in Table 9) shows the irrelevance of variables catching 
the individual social background as all the variables are statistically non-significant.  
< Insert Table 9 here > 
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c. The bivariate Probit model 
Following Greene (2013), one can say that a bivariate Probit consists of two Probit equations 
with correlated disturbances (error). Following the notation used for the Probit model, the 
general specification for this two equations model is given by: 
P(Objective Overeducation=1=YES) =  
P(Subjective Overeducation=1=YES) =  
and the error specification is given by: 
 
 
 
Interestingly, even though the assumptions of the bivariate Probit (see Table 10) differ 
substantially from those of a standard Probit model, the results of the estimate are consistent 
with those obtained estimating the two Probit models. Starting from the analysis of the 
determinants of JA, the bivariate Probit confirms the pivotal role played by the variables 
identifying the job post (sector and contracts) as drivers affecting significantly overeducation, 
contrary to individual characteristics, which play a marginal role. Moreover, the bivariate 
Probit also confirms the results concerning the WA overeducation. This result confirms the 
relevance of variables related to the graduates' experience in the labour market and raises 
doubts about the role of ability proxies. 
< Insert Table 10 here > 
 
6. The wage penalty  
Table 11 and 12 report estimates of the two Heckit models, used to assess possible wage 
penalties associated with overeducation as measured with WA and JA, respectively. Three 
different specifications have been estimated for both measurements, following basically the 
same steps adopted for the Probit estimates. The expected sign for the parameters of 
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overeducation is negative. Ceteris paribus, an overeducated worker is expected to earn a lower 
wage compared with that of a matched peer as a consequence of market wage differentials 
between graduate and non-graduate jobs. First, it is worth noting that the sign and the level of 
significance remains unaltered for most of the variables when comparing the corresponding 
columns between the two tables. Second, whatever the measure adopted, overeducation has a 
negative and statistically significant impact on wages in all of the three models. Overeducated 
graduate workers earn, ceteris paribus, lower wages than their matched counterparts. This 
evidence is consistent with evidence highlighted in pre-existing literature. In particular, our 
coefficients are close to those of Allen and Van der Velden (2001) and Di Pietro and Urwin 
(2006), ranging between 5% and 10% for both JA and WA measures. However, the penalty is 
lower than the one measured by Dolton and Vignoles (2000), Dolton and Silles (2008) and 
Chevalier and Lindley (2007) for overeducated graduates in the UK, and by Rubb (2003) for 
the US. This result is also in line with international comparisons showing that Italian 
overeducated graduates suffer one of the lowest pay-penalty in Europe (Ferrante et al., 2010; 
Barcena et al., 2011)10. Actually, other empirical studies referring to Italian data come out with 
even lower penalties. Cutillo and Di Pietro (2006) report a 4.4% wage penalty for WA 
overeducation using the same estimation method adopted in this study (while the penalty raise 
to 5.7% using instrumental variables). Franzini and Reitano (2009) find that the wage penalty is 
not significant once controlled for individual ability. This result can be explained by the poor 
tendency of wages in the Italian graduate labour market in the last decade as suggested by 
Ferrante et al. (2010). This is consistent with our evidence on wage premia earned by Italian 
graduates working abroad (+45%). Other studies report slightly higher wage penalties for 
overeducated Italian graduates, ranging between 10% and 15% (Carmen and Pastore, 2013).  
< Insert Table 11 here > 
However, it is important to emphasize that in all the three specifications the WA measure for 
overeducation is associated with higher penalties compared to those reported for the JA 
measure. This evidence can be interpreted referring to the results obtained in the analysis of the 
determinants. As expected, individual characteristics play a more relevant role in the analysis 
of WA overeducation than in that of JA overeducation. The way in which graduates perceive 
                                                           
10
 Ferrante et al. (2010) report the absence of a wage penalty for Italian (and Estonian) overeducated 
graduate workers, whereas in the other surveyed countries such penalty ranges between 21% and 54%. 
Barcena-Martin et al. (2011) estimate that Italy is the only European country where the wage penalty 
fails to be statistically significant. 
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their job position or their relative position in the labour market can affect their perception to be 
overeducated. WA overeducation can be thus considered to be more than a simple indicator of 
educational mismatch as it accounts also for graduates’ perception of their relations to either 
the job or the labour market. As a result, WA overeducation is a biased indicator of 
overeducation. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the wage penalty associated with WA 
overeducation is significantly higher than that of JA overeducation. 
< Insert Table 12 here > 
 
Conclusion 
This paper introduces a new measurement of overeducation in order to address the 
measurement error problem highlighted by the relevant economic literature. As the 
measurement error is typically associated with biases generated by workers’ self-assessment 
(WA) we develop a job analysis measure (JA) based on the SOC(HE)-Italy occupational 
classification dealing with possible further sources of measurement error. We thus carry out 
analyses with both measures on the possible determinants and the impact on wages of 
overeducation. We try to assess the extent to which certain factors affect the probability to be 
overeducated by estimating five different specifications of a single Probit model.  
We can derive at least three conclusions from our analysis.  
First, it is important to emphasize that job characteristics are significant determinants for both 
JA and WA. Data availability allows us to take into account two different factors which 
identify a job post: its techno-organisational content and its socio-institutional context, both 
regulating the employment relation and the performance of its constituent tasks. The former is 
proxied by two sets of dummy variables identifying the industry and the relevant field of study. 
Actually, this set of variables describes the cognitive content of the constituent tasks of a 
particular job. In this view, the relevant field of study  represents job requirements of labour 
demand rather than a distinctive trait of labour supply. The latter is represented by the 
contractual basis. Graduates on either a self-employment or a fixed term contract are less likely 
to be overeducated than graduates with open-ended contracts. This evidence could be explained 
by two not mutually exclusive explanations. On the one hand, it may indicate that workers 
prefer a job on an open-ended contract, even though it does not fully match their skills and, 
possibly, their expectations. They accept job proposal on an open-ended employment contract, 
because they value the expected tenure and security above the match between their skills and 
the job contents. On the other hand, this lower probability can derive from employers' hiring 
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strategies. Firms could use the open-ended employment relationship as an incentive for 
employees' long term attachment. If internal labour markets operate and favour upward internal 
mobility, ports of entry can be opened at a low level with the prospect to match individual skills 
and job contents after a lapse of internal career or of on-the-job training.  
Second, individual characteristics have a different impact on the two different measures of 
overeducation. The impact of gender supports the view that women are less JA overeducated 
than men, while the difference is not significant for WA. Thus, we do not find only that 
graduated women are less likely to be overeducated than men, but also that women may 
perceive to be overeducated although the cognitive content of their assigned job does match 
with their educational attainment. This insight is supported by our evidence that women win 
larger wage premia (17.6%) than men if they find a matched job11. Graduates’ social and family 
background is a determinant of overeducation only when the JA measure is adopted. 
Consequently, our JA measure captures the better career opportunities entailed by a higher 
social background. On the contrary, effects on overeducation measured by WA are ambiguous 
as this subjective measure is upwardly biased by higher expectations in terms of wages and 
careers. 
Finally, the characteristics of the graduates' experience in both the external and the internal 
labour market, such as working experience and tenure, measured in years, are relevant only as 
determinants of WA while they are not statistically significant for JA. This is not surprising as 
WA does not embody only job characteristics but accounts also for the overall individual 
experience in the labour market. Since we have only one observation at five years after the 
degree without any information on the number of jobs graduates had in that period we cannot 
derive any suggestion with regard to the hypothesis that overeducation is just a temporary 
phenomenon.  
We have thus run Heckit estimates to assess the impact of overeducation on wages. We find 
that, anyhow defined, overeducated workers suffer a wage penalty when compared to their 
peers employed in a matched job. Nevertheless, differences between alternative definitions of 
overeducation arise when referring to the magnitude of such penalty. The JA measure reports a 
lower wage penalty (8.0%) than the WA measure does (9.9%). This evidence is consistent with 
previous findings by Sloane et al. (1999) for the UK, by Cohn and Kahn for the US and by 
Groot and van den Brink (2000) for the Netherlands. From this result we draw two different 
conclusions. First, job satisfaction and individual expectations may affect the perception to be 
overeducated. If so, the WA measure of overeducation accounts also for factors other than 
educational mismatches. Individual motivation, job satisfaction and wellbeing at work can be 
                                                           
11
 Rubb (2003) obtains similar results. 
27 
 
positively correlated with WA overeducation while omitting variables related to such 
dimensions can result in upward biases (Pollmann-Schult and Buchel, 2004; Vaisey, 2006; 
Green and Zhu, 2008). Accordingly, wage penalties associated with WA overeducation 
incorporate the lower intrinsic motivation of graduated reporting to be overeducated. For this 
reason the introduction of these variables in the specification can represent a further step in the 
empirical research on this topic applied to the Italian context. Second, skill heterogeneity can 
play a different role according to the chosen measure. Unobserved individual characteristics 
can affect overeducation perception and thus WA measures while this is not the case when 
using JA measures. All in all, we can claim that WA measures of overeducation are spurious 
indicators of different, interrelated phenomena, which makes the use of this measure highly 
problematic. 
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Table 1 EQF Framework (source: http://ec.europa.eu/education/lifelong-learning-policy/eqf_en.htm) 
Level Knowledge Skills Competence Example 
Level 1 Basic general knowledge basic skills required to carry out simple tasks 
work or study under direct supervision in a 
structured context 
 
Level 2 
Basic factual knowledge of a field of 
work or study 
basic cognitive and practical skills required 
to use relevant information in order to carry 
out tasks and to solve routine problems using 
simple rules and tools 
work or study under supervision with some 
autonomy 
lower secondary school 
Level 3 
Knowledge of facts, principles, 
processes and general concepts, in a 
field of work or study 
a range of cognitive and practical skills 
required to accomplish tasks and solve 
problems by selecting and applying basic 
methods, tools, materials and information 
take responsibility for completion of tasks 
in work or study; adapt own behaviour to 
circumstances in solving problems 
 
Level 4 
Factual and theoretical knowledge in 
broad contexts within a field of work 
or study 
a range of cognitive and practical skills 
required to generate solutions to specific 
problems in a field of work or study 
exercise self-management within the 
guidelines of work or study contexts that 
are usually predictable, but are subject to 
change; supervise the routine work of 
others, taking some responsibility for the 
evaluation and improvement of work or 
study activities 
Lower middle school 
Level 5 
Comprehensive, specialised, factual 
and theoretical knowledge within a 
field of work or study and an 
awareness of the boundaries of that 
knowledge 
a comprehensive range of cognitive and 
practical skills required to develop creative 
solutions to abstract problems 
exercise management and supervision in 
contexts of work or study activities where 
there is unpredictable change; review and 
develop performance of self and others 
Higher middle school 
Level 6 
(HE) 
Advanced knowledge of a field of 
work or study, involving a critical 
understanding of theories and 
principles 
advanced skills, demonstrating mastery and 
innovation, required to solve complex and 
unpredictable problems in a specialised field 
of work or study 
manage complex technical or professional 
activities or projects, taking responsibility 
for decision-making in unpredictable work 
or study contexts; take responsibility for 
managing professional development of 
individuals and groups 
Honours bachelor 
degree, vocational 
university German State-
certified Engineer, Business 
Manager and Designer 
(Fachhcochschule) 
Bachelor, City and Guilds, 
Graduateship(GCGI) 
Level 7 
(HE) 
Highly specialised knowledge, 
some of which is at the forefront 
of knowledge in a field of work or 
study, as the basis for original 
thinking and/or research; 
Critical awareness of knowledge 
issues in a field and at the 
interface between different fields 
specialised problem-solving skills required in 
research and/or innovation in order to 
develop new knowledge and procedures and 
to integrate knowledge from different fields 
manage and transform work or study 
contexts that are complex, unpredictable 
and require new strategic approaches; take 
responsibility for contributing to 
professional knowledge and practice and/or 
for reviewing the strategic performance of 
teams 
Masters, vocational 
university 
(Fachhcochschule) 
Masters, City and Guilds 
(MCGI) 
Level 8 
(HE) 
Knowledge at the most advanced 
frontier of a field of work or study 
and at the interface between fields 
the most advanced and specialised skills and 
techniques, including synthesis and 
evaluation, required to solve critical 
problems in research and/or innovation and 
to extend and redefine existing knowledge or 
professional practice 
demonstrate substantial authority, 
innovation, autonomy, scholarly and 
professional integrity and sustained 
commitment to the development of new 
ideas or processes at the forefront of work 
or study contexts including research 
Doctorate 
Awards - Fellowship 
 
Table 2 EQF levels for economists (2.5.3.1.1) according to SOC(HE)-Italy 
CP Code Job Title 
Experts  
EQF 
Strategists 
EQF 
Communicators 
EQF 
Highest 
EQF Score 
Major 
Group 
2.5.3.1.1 Specialists in economic systems 6.84 6.77 6.72 
Experts 
(6.84) EXP 
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Legend 
Variable  Description 
JA_OVERED JA Overeducated 
WA_OVERED WA Overeducated 
EXP Years of experience after graduation 
AGE Age at the time of the interview 
SEX Male 
EDU_PAR_PRIM Parental education: primary school 
EDU_PAR_SEC Parental education: secondary school 
EDU_PAR_HIGH Parental education: high school 
EDU_PAR_DEG Parental education: degree (at least one) 
OCC_FATH_ENT Father’s occupation: self-employed, entrepreneur, manager 
OCC_FATH_OTH Father’s occupation: employee, unemployed, inactive  
FATH_UPP Father’s social status: upper 
MOTH Mother 
TEN Tenured 
POST_GRAD Years of post-graduate education 
PHD Post graduate studies: Doctorate  
FIELD_AGRIC Field of study: Agriculture 
FIELD_ARCH Field of study: Architecture 
FIELD_PHA Field of study: Pharmaceutical 
FIELD_ECO Field of study: Economics and statistics 
FIELD_SPO Field of study: Sport science 
FIELD_GEO Field of study: Geo-biological 
FIELD_LAW Field of study: Law 
FIELD_ENG Field of study: Engineering 
FIELD_EDU Field of study: Education 
FIELD_HUM Field of study: Humanities 
FIELD_LAN Field of study: Foreign languages 
FIELD_MED Field of study: Medicine and dentistry 
FIELD_POL Field of study: Political and social sciences 
FIELD_PSYCH Field of study: Psychology 
FIELD_SCIE Field of study: Sciences 
AV_MARK Exams average mark 
DEG_MARK Degree mark 
HSCH_MARK High School mark 
DEL_IND Delay index 
AREA_NW Working area: North-west 
AREA_NE Working area: North-east 
AREA_CEN Working area: Centre 
AREA_SOU Working area: South 
AREA_ISL Working area: Islands 
AREA_ABR Working area: abroad 
LIV_NW Living area: North-west 
LIV_NE  Living area: North-east 
LIV_CEN Living area: Centre 
LIV_SOU Living area: South 
LIV_ISL Living area: Islands 
PERM_CON Open-ended contract 
FIX_CON Fixed-term contract 
SELF_EMPL Self-employed 
TRAIN_ CON Training contract 
TEMP_CON Temporary contract 
NONSTD_CON Non-standard employment contract 
NONSTD_SELF Non-standard self-employed 
OTH_NONSTD Other non-standard contracts 
NO_CON Without contract 
FULL_TIME Full-time 
IND_AGRIC Industry: Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
IND_PRINT Industry: Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
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IND_ENERGY Industry: Energy/mining 
IND_CHEM Industry: Manufacture of chemical products  
IND_MET Industry: Manufacture of metal products and machineries 
IND_ELECT Industry: Manufacture of electronic and electric products  
IND_OTHMAN Industry: Other manufacturing 
IND_CONSTR Industry: Construction 
IND_TRADE Industry: Wholesale and retail trade 
IND_TRANSP Industry: Transporting and storage 
IND_COMM Industry: Information and communication 
IND_FIN Industry: Financial and insurance activities 
IND_OTHCONS Industry: Other consulting and professional activities 
IND_INFOR Industry: Information service activities 
IND_BUS_SERV Industry: Other business support service activities 
IND_PUB Industry: Public administration and defence 
IND_EDU_RES Industry: Education/ R&D 
IND_HEAL Industry: Human health and social work activities 
IND_CULT Industry: Arts, entertainment and recreation 
IND_OTH_SERV Industry: Other services activities 
REG_STUD Regularity in studies  
STUD_WORK Working experience during studies  
COMP_SKIL Computer skills (ability in using excel spreadsheets) 
CONS_JOB Coherent job during studies 
TRAINEESHIP Training, apprenticeship  
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Table 3 – Descriptive statistics on overeducation 
Overeducated workers  %  
JA overeducated 20.9% 
WA overeducated 26.1% 
WA overeducated conditioned on being JA overeducated 72.4% 
JA overeducated conditioned on being WA overeducated 42.1% 
 
 
Table 4 - Overeducation by individual characteristics and social and family background 
 % Monthly net 
earning 
JA overeducated 
(%) 
WA 
overeducated (%) 
Female 60.9% 1233 24.2% 24.9% 
Male 39.1% 1737 21.4% 28.2% 
Parental education: primary 
school 5.4% 1396 24.0% 30.5% 
Parental education: secondary 
school 18.3% 1360 26.4% 31.4% 
Parental education: high school 37.4% 1382 24.6% 28.2% 
Parental education: degree (at 
least one) 26.3% 1451 19.3% 22.4% 
Father’s occupation: self-
employed, entrepreneur, manager 55.2% 1482 21.6% 25.5% 
Father’s occupation: employee, 
unemployed, inactive  44.8% 1359 25.1% 28.9% 
Mother 12.3% 1264 22.2% 32.7% 
Tenured 44.7% 1501 24.9% 33.9% 
 
 
Table 5 - Overeducation by educational attainment and field of study 
 % Monthly net 
earning 
JA overeducated 
(%) 
WA overeducated 
(%) 
Agriculture 2.7% 1202 31.4% 18.5% 
Architecture 5.0% 1222 30.7% 18.7% 
Pharmaceutical 4.6% 1405 10.9% 6.1% 
Economics and statistics 12.3% 1572 34.4% 40.4% 
Sport science 1.0% 1101 43.4% 36.9% 
Geo-biological 5.2% 1260 36.8% 19.0% 
Law 7.0% 1240 12.5% 12.3% 
Engineering 13.0% 1722 18.4% 33.1% 
Education 7.9% 1175 4.3% 12.5% 
Humanities 5.8% 1134 15.1% 20.8% 
Foreign languages 2.7% 1184 14.4% 19.6% 
Medicine and dentistry 13.2% 1459 7.8% 11.5% 
Political and social sciences 10.5% 1273 24.4% 32.2% 
Psychology 6.0% 1087 10.3% 19.6% 
Sciences 3.1% 1259 8.4% 17.3% 
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Table 6 – Overeducation by job characteristics 
  %  Monthly net 
earning 
JA overeducated 
(%) 
WA overeducated 
(%) 
Working area: North-west 22.9% 1464 21.4% 40.4% 
Working area: North-east 30.2% 1380 25.6% 44.7% 
Working area: Centre 24.9% 1324 23.6% 40.5% 
Working area: South 11.1% 1207 21.6% 40.7% 
Working area: Islands 5.6% 1264 23.5% 40.5% 
Working area: abroad 5.2% 2229 17.6% 38.1% 
Open-ended contract 50.2% 1547 29.1% 51.9% 
Fixed-term contract 15.3% 1345 19.3% 31.3% 
Self-employed 19.4% 1298 8.2% 20.0% 
Training contract 2.7% 1236 51.4% 66.4% 
Temporary contract 0.8% 1126 52.4% 66.5% 
Non-standard employment 
contract 8.1% 1334 26.5% 42.3% 
Non-standard self-employed 1.7% 1094 12.0% 30.1% 
Other non-standard contracts 0.2% 1102 21.0% 33.1% 
Without contract 1.3% 706 21.4% 48.8% 
Full-time 84.4% 1505 23.5% 41.9% 
Part-time 15.6% 832 21.2% 40.4% 
 
 
Table 7 - Overeducation by industry (NACE code) 
 % Monthly net 
earning 
JA 
overeducated 
(%) 
WA 
overeducated 
(%) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.9% 1232 66.9% 53.4% 
Printing and reproduction of 
recorded media 
0.8% 1088 22.6% 74.6% 
Energy/mining 2.7% 1759 35.0% 43.4% 
Manufacture of chemical products  2.4% 1623 34.8% 44.3% 
Manufacture of metal products and 
machineries 
5.1% 1709 31.6% 56.9% 
Manufacture of electronic and 
electric products  
1.2% 1761 16.9% 41.6% 
Other manufacturing 2.9% 1555 45.5% 63.9% 
Construction 3.6% 1402 25.1% 33.0% 
Wholesale and retail trade 7.5% 1315 38.1% 53.2% 
Transporting and storage 1.3% 1425 45.5% 71.4% 
Information and communication 2.5% 1335 21.0% 71.0% 
Financial and insurance activities 6.2% 1571 57.8% 67.6% 
Other consulting and professional 
activities 
7.4% 1277 5.4% 13.8% 
Information service activities 3.6% 1589 14.0% 65.4% 
Other business support service 
activities 
2.5% 1284 44.0% 66.2% 
Public administration and defence 5.7% 1592 28.0% 54.4% 
Education/ R&D 16.4% 1199 9.5% 19.1% 
Human health and social work 
activities 
12.7% 1579 12.4% 27.8% 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 2.2% 1023 34.1% 71.7% 
Other services activities 4.6% 1039 18.8% 54.0% 
No answer 1.0% - - - 
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Table 8- Probit model with JA measure for overeducation as dependent variable. Marginal effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 SOC_Overed SOC_Overed SOC_Overed SOC_Overed SOC_Overed  
IND_AGRIC 1.825*** 1.807*** 1.535*** 1.495*** 1.496*** 
 (0.1151) (0.1154) (0.1985) (0.2014) (0.2019) 
IND_PRINT 0.221* 0.224* -0.00977 0.00150 0.00419 
 (0.1245) (0.1251) (0.2325) (0.2331) (0.2332) 
IND_ENERGY 0.751*** 0.757*** 0.916*** 0.911*** 0.921*** 
 (0.0831) (0.0834) (0.1647) (0.1666) (0.1668) 
IND_CHEM 0.653*** 0.644*** 0.866*** 0.871*** 0.871*** 
 (0.0859) (0.0862) (0.1725) (0.1752) (0.1753) 
IND_MET 0.624*** 0.623*** 0.992*** 1.012*** 1.014*** 
 (0.0730) (0.0735) (0.1427) (0.1451) (0.1454) 
IND_ELECT 0.261** 0.275** 0.638*** 0.646*** 0.667*** 
 (0.1110) (0.1114) (0.2419) (0.2431) (0.2435) 
IND_OTHMAN 0.916*** 0.912*** 0.878*** 0.854*** 0.858*** 
 (0.0790) (0.0794) (0.1468) (0.1489) (0.1493) 
IND_CONSTR 0.489*** 0.472*** 0.923*** 0.976*** 0.971*** 
 (0.0873) (0.0875) (0.1698) (0.1722) (0.1725) 
IND_TRADE 0.762*** 0.743*** 1.169*** 1.167*** 1.168*** 
 (0.0652) (0.0654) (0.1230) (0.1248) (0.1250) 
IND_TRANSP 0.950*** 0.947*** 0.976*** 1.003*** 0.999*** 
 (0.1066) (0.1071) (0.1885) (0.1906) (0.1910) 
IND_COMM 0.265*** 0.276*** 0.170 0.157 0.165 
 (0.0866) (0.0870) (0.1552) (0.1573) (0.1574) 
IND_FIN 1.325*** 1.317*** 1.261*** 1.260*** 1.267*** 
 (0.0714) (0.0717) (0.1341) (0.1357) (0.1360) 
IND_OTHCONS -0.210*** -0.233*** -0.126 -0.0943 -0.0949 
 (0.0779) (0.0781) (0.1465) (0.1482) (0.1483) 
IND_INFOR 0.0819 0.0836 0.360** 0.329* 0.331** 
 (0.0823) (0.0826) (0.1646) (0.1685) (0.1687) 
IND_BUS_SERV 0.884*** 0.868*** 0.905*** 0.881*** 0.885*** 
 (0.0822) (0.0825) (0.1458) (0.1486) (0.1489) 
IND_PUB 0.556*** 0.523*** 0.198 0.247* 0.247* 
 (0.0722) (0.0726) (0.1285) (0.1312) (0.1314) 
IND_EDU_RES -0.487*** -0.521*** -0.384*** -0.374*** -0.378*** 
 (0.0716) (0.0719) (0.1337) (0.1357) (0.1359) 
IND_HEAL 0.0221 -0.00703 0.184 0.199 0.207 
 (0.0657) (0.0660) (0.1334) (0.1350) (0.1352) 
IND_CULT 0.671*** 0.665*** 0.526*** 0.542*** 0.534*** 
 (0.0942) (0.0945) (0.1555) (0.1570) (0.1572) 
IND_OTH_SERV 0.233*** 0.222*** 0.213 0.235 0.226 
 (0.0854) (0.0857) (0.1456) (0.1476) (0.1479) 
SELF_EMPL -0.586*** -0.604*** -0.649*** -0.633*** -0.618*** 
 (0.0404) (0.0406) (0.0719) (0.0729) (0.0732) 
NONSTD_CON 0.447*** 0.447*** 0.483* 0.472* 0.466* 
 (0.1102) (0.1105) (0.2567) (0.2566) (0.2563) 
OTH_NONSTD -0.482*** -0.484*** -0.355*** -0.347** -0.326** 
 (0.0803) (0.0804) (0.1377) (0.1393) (0.1399) 
FIX_CON -0.515*** -0.508*** -0.548** -0.535** -0.526** 
 (0.1141) (0.1144) (0.2626) (0.2628) (0.2625) 
FULL_TIME -0.0951*** -0.0763** -0.202*** -0.213*** -0.212*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0355) (0.0622) (0.0635) (0.0636) 
SEX -0.220*** -0.212*** -0.162*** -0.155*** -0.152*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0253) (0.0453) (0.0466) (0.0468) 
AREA_NW  -0.109*** -0.0634 -0.0535 -0.0437 
  (0.0347) (0.0600) (0.0612) (0.0615) 
AREA_SOU  0.0432 0.0463 0.0340 0.0265 
  (0.0403) (0.0682) (0.0694) (0.0695) 
AREA_ABR  -0.368*** -0.532*** -0.516*** -0.498*** 
  (0.0616) (0.1262) (0.1330) (0.1335) 
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POST_GRAD   -0.172*** -0.174*** -0.172*** 
   (0.0316) (0.0322) (0.0321) 
AGE   -0.0260 -0.0184 -0.0258 
   (0.0288) (0.0308) (0.0309) 
AGE SQUARED   0.000381 0.000282 0.000352 
   (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
EXP   0.356* 0.327 0.324 
   (0.2030) (0.2066) (0.2068) 
EXP SQUARED   -0.0432 -0.0385 -0.0383 
   (0.0272) (0.0276) (0.0277) 
TEN   -0.0362 -0.0423 -0.0470 
   (0.0501) (0.0509) (0.0510) 
FIELD_AGRIC   0.607*** 0.242* 0.241* 
   (0.1729) (0.1292) (0.1295) 
FIELD_ARCH   0.216 -0.234 -0.235 
   (0.1873) (0.1526) (0.1526) 
FIELD_PHA   -0.956*** -1.272*** -1.263*** 
   (0.1783) (0.1405) (0.1406) 
FIELD_ECO   0.202 -0.214*** -0.214*** 
   (0.1355) (0.0733) (0.0734) 
FIELD_LAW   0.434*** -0.00923 -0.0110 
   (0.1647) (0.1184) (0.1185) 
FIELD_ENG   -0.367*** -0.759*** -0.762*** 
   (0.1424) (0.0959) (0.0961) 
FIELD_HUM   0.523*** 0.0659 0.0743 
   (0.1503) (0.0813) (0.0813) 
FIELD_MED   0.440*** 0.0179 0.0129 
   (0.1659) (0.0982) (0.0983) 
FIELD_PSYCH   0.117 -0.328*** -0.332*** 
   (0.1540) (0.0814) (0.0815) 
PHD   0.539*** 0.550*** 0.535*** 
   (0.1547) (0.1575) (0.1578) 
AV_MARK    0.113** 0.108** 
    (0.0493) (0.0493) 
DEG_MARK    0.0148*** 0.0145*** 
    (0.0044) (0.0044) 
OCC_FATH_ENT     -0.0696 
     (0.0437) 
EDU_PAR_DEG     -0.125** 
     (0.0556) 
_cons -0.952*** -0.933*** -1.205* -2.413** -2.149** 
 (0.0669) (0.0707) (0.7030) (0.9539) (0.9580) 
Pseudo R2 0.1654 0.1691 0.2083 0.2108 0.2123 
N 18045 18034 6219 6065 6065 
Standard error in parenthesis 
* Significant at 10% 
**Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
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Table 9 - Probit model with WA measure for overeducation as dependent variable. Marginal effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 SOC_Overed SOC_Overed SOC_Overed SOC_Overed SOC_Overed 
IND_AGRIC 0.671*** 0.656*** 0.988*** 1.027*** 1.022*** 
 (0.0922) (0.0925) (0.1746) (0.1789) (0.1790) 
IND_PRINT 1.113*** 1.121*** 0.850*** 0.842*** 0.847*** 
 (0.1006) (0.1007) (0.1848) (0.1853) (0.1854) 
IND_ENERGY 0.158*** 0.167*** 0.470*** 0.455*** 0.454*** 
 (0.0604) (0.0606) (0.1234) (0.1244) (0.1245) 
IND_CHEM 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.765*** 0.769*** 0.769*** 
 (0.0628) (0.0629) (0.1380) (0.1401) (0.1401) 
IND_MET 0.486*** 0.481*** 0.840*** 0.850*** 0.849*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0507) (0.1017) (0.1033) (0.1033) 
IND_ELECT 0.130 0.133* 0.364** 0.322* 0.322* 
 (0.0800) (0.0803) (0.1836) (0.1856) (0.1857) 
IND_OTHMAN 0.676*** 0.663*** 0.934*** 0.910*** 0.906*** 
 (0.0592) (0.0593) (0.1125) (0.1143) (0.1143) 
IND_CONSTR 0.105* 0.0997* 0.353*** 0.355*** 0.351*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0555) (0.1091) (0.1108) (0.1109) 
IND_TRADE 0.458*** 0.439*** 1.118*** 1.114*** 1.109*** 
 (0.0451) (0.0452) (0.0927) (0.0940) (0.0941) 
IND_TRANSP 0.909*** 0.904*** 1.026*** 1.044*** 1.046*** 
 (0.0805) (0.0808) (0.1459) (0.1485) (0.1486) 
IND_COMM 0.967*** 0.988*** 0.933*** 0.928*** 0.928*** 
 (0.0630) (0.0631) (0.1169) (0.1181) (0.1181) 
IND_FIN 0.758*** 0.746*** 0.832*** 0.812*** 0.812*** 
 (0.0486) (0.0487) (0.0942) (0.0952) (0.0952) 
IND_OTHCONS -0.390*** -0.414*** -0.161 -0.176* -0.180* 
 (0.0509) (0.0510) (0.0995) (0.1010) (0.1010) 
IND_INFOR 0.757*** 0.760*** 1.185*** 1.196*** 1.196*** 
 (0.0557) (0.0558) (0.1183) (0.1219) (0.1219) 
IND_BUS_SERV 0.776*** 0.763*** 0.955*** 0.929*** 0.927*** 
 (0.0625) (0.0626) (0.1129) (0.1151) (0.1151) 
IND_PUB 0.450*** 0.421*** 0.257*** 0.245*** 0.246*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0492) (0.0853) (0.0870) (0.0870) 
IND_EDU_RES -0.469*** -0.493*** -0.238*** -0.242*** -0.241*** 
 (0.0432) (0.0433) (0.0836) (0.0850) (0.0850) 
IND_HEAL -0.0991** -0.126*** 0.161* 0.160* 0.160* 
 (0.0416) (0.0418) (0.0885) (0.0898) (0.0898) 
IND_CULT 1.046*** 1.041*** 0.772*** 0.782*** 0.782*** 
 (0.0667) (0.0668) (0.1107) (0.1123) (0.1123) 
IND_OTH_SERV 0.480*** 0.463*** 0.355*** 0.350*** 0.349*** 
 (0.0517) (0.0518) (0.0908) (0.0921) (0.0921) 
SELF_EMPL -0.676*** -0.690*** -0.546*** -0.548*** -0.549*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0282) (0.0515) (0.0524) (0.0525) 
NONSTD_CON 0.294*** 0.297*** 0.0266 0.0145 0.0110 
 (0.0937) (0.0939) (0.2142) (0.2147) (0.2148) 
OTH_NONSTD -0.450*** -0.448*** -0.238** -0.241** -0.241** 
 (0.0519) (0.0520) (0.0971) (0.0985) (0.0986) 
FIX_CON -0.545*** -0.540*** -0.0849 -0.0682 -0.0668 
 (0.0959) (0.0961) (0.2176) (0.2181) (0.2182) 
FULL_TIME -0.140*** -0.124*** -0.217*** -0.232*** -0.233*** 
 (0.0257) (0.0259) (0.0468) (0.0477) (0.0478) 
SEX -0.0148 -0.00741 0.0483 0.0562 0.0588* 
 (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0343) (0.0353) (0.0354) 
AREA_NW  -0.0751*** -0.0943** -0.0818* -0.0856* 
  (0.0255) (0.0440) (0.0449) (0.0451) 
AREA_SOU  0.131*** 0.212*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 
  (0.0296) (0.0498) (0.0506) (0.0506) 
AREA_ABR  -0.183*** -0.214** -0.195** -0.197** 
  (0.0421) (0.0848) (0.0893) (0.0894) 
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POST_GRAD   -0.144*** -0.146*** -0.146*** 
   (0.0207) (0.0210) (0.0210) 
AGE   0.0781*** 0.0880*** 0.0870*** 
   (0.0202) (0.0214) (0.0215) 
AGE SQUARED   -0.000956*** -0.00108*** -0.00107*** 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
EXP   0.697*** 0.746*** 0.748*** 
   (0.1489) (0.1516) (0.1517) 
EXP SQUARED   -0.0773*** -0.0837*** -0.0841*** 
   (0.0201) (0.0205) (0.0205) 
TEN   0.454*** 0.461*** 0.460*** 
   (0.0361) (0.0367) (0.0367) 
FIELD_AGRIC   -0.487*** -0.678*** -0.681*** 
   (0.1435) (0.1138) (0.1138) 
FIELD_ARCH   -0.320** -0.491*** -0.492*** 
   (0.1257) (0.0896) (0.0897) 
FIELD_PHA   -1.930*** -2.088*** -2.085*** 
   (0.1497) (0.1241) (0.1241) 
FIELD_ECO   -0.155 -0.338*** -0.340*** 
   (0.1065) (0.0586) (0.0587) 
FIELD_LAW   -0.290** -0.491*** -0.492*** 
   (0.1303) (0.0949) (0.0949) 
FIELD_ENG   -0.578*** -0.753*** -0.756*** 
   (0.1088) (0.0705) (0.0706) 
FIELD_HUM   0.260** 0.0524 0.0548 
   (0.1181) (0.0639) (0.0639) 
FIELD_MED   -0.140 -0.313*** -0.313*** 
   (0.1225) (0.0681) (0.0681) 
FIELD_PSYCH   -0.0571 -0.259*** -0.264*** 
   (0.1153) (0.0582) (0.0583) 
PHD   0.251** 0.281*** 0.286*** 
   (0.1044) (0.1069) (0.1069) 
AV_MARK    0.101*** 0.101*** 
    (0.0367) (0.0367) 
DEG_MARK    0.00571* 0.00560* 
    (0.0032) (0.0032) 
OCC_FATH_ENT     0.0340 
     (0.0324) 
EDU_PAR_DEG     -0.0529 
     (0.0413) 
_cons -0.152*** -0.177*** -3.026*** -3.791*** -3.762*** 
 (0.0443) (0.0472) (0.5022) (0.6753) (0.6776) 
Pseudo R2 0.1433 0.1467 0.2187 0.2215 0.22217 
N 25155 25131 9139 8912 8912 
Standard error in parenthesis 
* Significant at 10% 
**Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
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Table 10 - Bivariate probit model with WA measure for overeducation as dependent variable 
 OVERED SOC_Overed 
   
POST_GRAD -0.143*** -0.172*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0322) 
AGE 0.0981*** -0.0264 
 (0.0266) (0.0307) 
AGE_SQUARED -0.00108*** 0.000382 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) 
EXP 0.737*** 0.370* 
 (0.1862) (0.2066) 
EXP SQUARED -0.0847*** -0.0431 
 (0.0251) (0.0276) 
TEN 0.501*** -0.0469 
 (0.0459) (0.0511) 
FIELD_AGRIC -0.573*** 0.669*** 
 (0.1682) (0.1761) 
FIELD_ARCH -0.169 0.197 
 (0.1790) (0.1927) 
FIELD_PHA -2.103*** -0.856*** 
 (0.1799) (0.1857) 
FIELD_ECO -0.269** 0.222 
 (0.1299) (0.1378) 
FIELD_LAW -0.409*** 0.435*** 
 (0.1554) (0.1671) 
FIELD_ENG -0.652*** -0.317** 
 (0.1335) (0.1454) 
FIELD_HUM 0.135 0.493*** 
 (0.1436) (0.1531) 
FIELD_MED -0.189 0.415** 
 (0.1558) (0.1697) 
FIELD_PSYCH -0.294** 0.0814 
 (0.1432) (0.1562) 
SEX 0.0448 -0.151*** 
 (0.0434) (0.0467) 
PHD 0.443*** 0.543*** 
 (0.1353) (0.1584) 
IND_AGRIC 1.112*** 1.482*** 
 (0.2040) (0.2028) 
IND_PRINT 0.784*** 0.0427 
 (0.1961) (0.2264) 
IND_ENERGY 0.433*** 0.893*** 
 (0.1451) (0.1656) 
IND_CHEM 0.801*** 0.865*** 
 (0.1603) (0.1733) 
IND_MET 0.837*** 0.993*** 
 (0.1244) (0.1437) 
IND_ELECT 0.252 0.603** 
 (0.2141) (0.2461) 
IND_OTHMAN 0.848*** 0.837*** 
 (0.1341) (0.1479) 
IND_CONSTR 0.399*** 0.925*** 
 (0.1517) (0.1726) 
IND_TRADE 1.105*** 1.150*** 
 (0.1112) (0.1240) 
IND_TRANSP 0.939*** 0.975*** 
 (0.1876) (0.1891) 
IND_COMM 0.886*** 0.173 
 (0.1352) (0.1548) 
IND_FIN 0.678*** 1.244*** 
 (0.1166) (0.1343) 
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IND_OTHCONS -0.225* -0.136 
 (0.1152) (0.1478) 
IND_INFOR 1.222*** 0.327** 
 (0.1409) (0.1663) 
IND_BUS_SERV 0.895*** 0.871*** 
 (0.1362) (0.1475) 
IND_PUB 0.0439 0.212 
 (0.1074) (0.1305) 
IND_EDU_RES -0.293*** -0.410*** 
 (0.1060) (0.1343) 
IND_HEAL 0.0483 0.182 
 (0.1115) (0.1352) 
IND_CULT 0.627*** 0.525*** 
 (0.1435) (0.1553) 
IND_OTH_SERV 0.292** 0.202 
 (0.1229) (0.1476) 
SELF_EMPL -0.566*** -0.633*** 
 (0.0634) (0.0733) 
NONSTD_CON -0.0469 0.443* 
 (0.2529) (0.2528) 
OTH_NONSTD -0.438*** -0.331** 
 (0.1258) (0.1413) 
FIX_CON -0.0161 -0.496* 
 (0.2574) (0.2590) 
FULL_TIME -0.210*** -0.212*** 
 (0.0599) (0.0639) 
AV_MARK 0.146*** 0.107** 
 (0.0450) (0.0492) 
DEG_MARK 0.00892** 0.0151*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0044) 
OCC_FATH_ENT 0.0498 -0.0782* 
 (0.0395) (0.0437) 
EDU_PAR_DEG -0.0603 -0.119** 
 (0.0498) (0.0554) 
_cons -4.643*** -2.736*** 
 (0.8418) (0.9595) 
athrho  0.371*** 
  (0.0278) 
N 6065 6065 
Wald χ2  2420.69 
Log-likelihood  -5710.56 
Standard error in parenthesis 
* Significant at 10% 
**Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1%
46 
 
Table 11 - Heckman selection model with natural logarithm of net monthly wage as dependent variable; overeducation 
measured as JA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 lnW lnW lnW 
SOC_Overed -0.0827*** -0.0819*** -0.0801*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
EXP 0.00177 -0.0174 -0.0167 
 (0.0685) (0.0692) (0.0690) 
EXP SQUARED 0.00481 0.00746 0.00739 
 (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0092) 
TEN 0.0617*** 0.0597*** 0.0596*** 
 (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0133) 
SEX 0.169*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0140) 
AREA_NW 0.0536*** 0.0521*** 0.0503*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
AREA_SOU -0.121*** -0.121*** -0.120*** 
 (0.0239) (0.0242) (0.0242) 
AREA_ABR 0.440*** 0.428*** 0.424*** 
 (0.0339) (0.0341) (0.0341) 
SELF_EMPL 0.778*** 0.779*** 0.775*** 
 (0.1064) (0.1066) (0.1061) 
PERM_CONTR 0.889*** 0.888*** 0.889*** 
 (0.1042) (0.1042) (0.1037) 
TRAIN_CONTR 0.775*** 0.776*** 0.775*** 
 (0.1071) (0.1071) (0.1066) 
NONSTD_CONT 0.632*** 0.633*** 0.636*** 
 (0.1318) (0.1314) (0.1312) 
NONSTD_SELF 0.644*** 0.644*** 0.644*** 
 (0.1083) (0.1086) (0.1081) 
OTH_NONSTD 0.525*** 0.537*** 0.532*** 
 (0.1215) (0.1211) (0.1206) 
FIX_CON 0.194** 0.192** 0.189** 
 (0.0827) (0.0820) (0.0823) 
IND_PRINT 0.0979 0.0979 0.0974 
 (0.0646) (0.0658) (0.0658) 
IND_ENERGY -0.205*** -0.203** -0.202** 
 (0.0793) (0.0794) (0.0790) 
IND_CHEM 0.142*** 0.169*** 0.165*** 
 (0.0382) (0.0322) (0.0325) 
IND_MET 0.176*** 0.174*** 0.172*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0279) (0.0280) 
IND_ELECT 0.128*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0252) (0.0251) 
IND_OTHMAN 0.0977** 0.0956* 0.0905* 
 (0.0497) (0.0496) (0.0492) 
IND_FIN 0.122*** 0.121*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0255) (0.0255) 
IND_INFOR 0.0839* 0.0846* 0.0834* 
 (0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0453) 
FIELD_AGRIC -0.0951* -0.0930* -0.0954* 
 (0.0528) (0.0534) (0.0533) 
FILD_ECO -0.0273 -0.0352 -0.0355 
 (0.0577) (0.0597) (0.0593) 
FIELD_SPO 0.116*** 0.121*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0398) (0.0397) 
FIELD_ENG 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.141*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0331) (0.0331) 
FIELD_HUM -0.158** -0.159** -0.158** 
 (0.0658) (0.0663) (0.0661) 
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FIELD_MED 0.00364 0.00469 0.00730 
 (0.0482) (0.0487) (0.0485) 
FIELD _POL 0.00691 0.0144 0.0132 
 (0.0471) (0.0483) (0.0483) 
FIELD _PSYCH 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0332) (0.0332) 
HSCH_MARK -0.000474 -0.000646 -0.000631 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
REG_STUD -0.00321 -0.00279 -0.00227 
 (0.0067) (0.0070) (0.0069) 
STUD_WORK 0.0316** 0.0320** 0.0324** 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0146) 
COMP_SKIL  0.0106* 0.0106* 
  (0.0062) (0.0062) 
OCC_FATH_ENT   0.0228* 
   (0.0121) 
_cons 6.062*** 6.072*** 6.063*** 
 (0.1706) (0.1735) (0.1733) 
Occ_Heckit    
EDU_PAR_DEG -0.180*** -0.176*** -0.181*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0399) (0.0400) 
POST_GRAD 0.0587*** 0.0593*** 0.0597*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0226) 
LIV_NW 0.260*** 0.263*** 0.264*** 
 (0.0537) (0.0539) (0.0539) 
LIV_NE 0.222*** 0.222*** 0.222*** 
 (0.0491) (0.0494) (0.0493) 
LIV_SOU -0.245*** -0.262*** -0.262*** 
 (0.0551) (0.0556) (0.0555) 
LIV_ISL -0.107 -0.127* -0.127* 
 (0.0689) (0.0696) (0.0696) 
LIV_ABR -0.764*** -0.746*** -0.742*** 
 (0.2398) (0.2398) (0.2398) 
DEL_IND -0.167** -0.162** -0.162** 
 (0.0676) (0.0683) (0.0683) 
CONS_JOB -0.113*** -0.107*** -0.107*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0235) (0.0235) 
MOTH -0.228*** -0.237*** -0.237*** 
 (0.0513) (0.0518) (0.0517) 
STUD_WORK 0.424*** 0.422*** 0.421*** 
 (0.0458) (0.0463) (0.0463) 
TRAINEESHIP -0.253*** -0.247*** -0.246*** 
 (0.0484) (0.0487) (0.0488) 
PHD -1.390*** -1.382*** -1.382*** 
 (0.0943) (0.0945) (0.0945) 
_cons 1.460*** 1.377*** 1.376*** 
 (0.3832) (0.3881) (0.3879) 
Field of study Yes Yes Yes 
athrho    
_cons -0.196*** -0.195*** -0.204*** 
 (0.0558) (0.0548) (0.0562) 
lnsigma    
_cons -0.994*** -0.997*** -0.997*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0190) 
N 7408 7285 7285 
Wald χ2 1474.99 1644.56           2291.39 
Robust standard error in parenthesis 
* Significant at 10% 
**Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
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Table 12 - Heckman selection model with natural logarithm of net monthly wage as dependent variable; overeducation 
measured as WA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 lnW lnW lnW 
OVERED -0.101*** -0.0989*** -0.0993*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0098) 
EXP -0.00962 -0.0272 -0.0258 
 (0.0544) (0.0551) (0.0551) 
EXP SQUARED 0.00608 0.00844 0.00829 
 (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0074) 
TEN 0.0553*** 0.0537*** 0.0546*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
SEX 0.160*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
AREA_NW 0.0462*** 0.0448*** 0.0435*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
AREA_SOU -0.0933*** -0.0942*** -0.0916*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
AREA_ABR 0.452*** 0.443*** 0.439*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0264) (0.0264) 
SELF_EMPL 0.698*** 0.716*** 0.711*** 
 (0.0870) (0.0884) (0.0881) 
PERM_CONTR 0.848*** 0.866*** 0.867*** 
 (0.0853) (0.0866) (0.0863) 
TRAIN_CONTR 0.722*** 0.738*** 0.738*** 
 (0.0871) (0.0885) (0.0881) 
NONSTD_CONT 0.578*** 0.595*** 0.599*** 
 (0.1033) (0.1042) (0.1039) 
NONSTD_SELF 0.576*** 0.594*** 0.594*** 
 (0.0881) (0.0895) (0.0892) 
OTH_NONSTD 0.426*** 0.451*** 0.448*** 
 (0.0970) (0.0980) (0.0976) 
FIX_CON 0.196*** 0.197*** 0.193*** 
 (0.0597) (0.0594) (0.0593) 
IND_PRINT -0.142* -0.140* -0.139* 
 (0.0734) (0.0734) (0.0732) 
IND_ENERGY 0.115*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 
 (0.0306) (0.0264) (0.0265) 
IND_CHEM 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 
 (0.0224) (0.0227) (0.0226) 
IND_MET 0.0908*** 0.0882*** 0.0881*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0197) (0.0196) 
IND_ELECT 0.0760* 0.0766* 0.0710* 
 (0.0423) (0.0423) (0.0420) 
IND_OTHMAN 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0202) 
IND_FIN 0.0823*** 0.0807*** 0.0810*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0145) 
IND_INFOR 0.0963*** 0.0867*** 0.0869*** 
 (0.0270) (0.0266) (0.0265) 
FIELD_AGRIC -0.105*** -0.102*** -0.101*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0372) (0.0370) 
FILD_ECO 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
FIELD_SPO -0.136*** -0.143*** -0.141*** 
 (0.0398) (0.0402) (0.0401) 
FIELD_ENG 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0174) (0.0174) 
FIELD_HUM -0.112*** -0.110*** -0.110*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0193) (0.0193) 
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FIELD_MED 0.228*** 0.231*** 0.232*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0181) (0.0181) 
FIELD _POL 0.0697*** 0.0731*** 0.0733*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0129) 
FIELD _PSYCH -0.233*** -0.238*** -0.237*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
HSCH_MARK -0.000774* -0.000924** -0.000881** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
REG_STUD -0.00974* -0.0110** -0.0107** 
 (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0053) 
STUD_WORK 0.0359*** 0.0388*** 0.0399*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
COMP_SKIL  0.00828* 0.00836* 
  (0.0049) (0.0049) 
OCC_FATH_ENT   0.0195** 
   (0.0097) 
_cons 6.293*** 6.283*** 6.262*** 
 (0.1334) (0.1355) (0.1353) 
Occ_Heckit    
EDU_PAR_DEG -0.178*** -0.176*** -0.178*** 
 (0.0364) (0.0366) (0.0366) 
POST_GRAD 0.0365* 0.0366* 0.0367* 
 (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0214) 
LIV_NW 0.245*** 0.247*** 0.247*** 
 (0.0493) (0.0496) (0.0496) 
LIV_NE 0.201*** 0.205*** 0.204*** 
 (0.0449) (0.0452) (0.0451) 
LIV_SOU -0.262*** -0.279*** -0.280*** 
 (0.0503) (0.0508) (0.0508) 
LIV_ISL -0.201*** -0.213*** -0.213*** 
 (0.0626) (0.0633) (0.0633) 
LIV_ABR -0.905*** -0.886*** -0.885*** 
 (0.2375) (0.2374) (0.2372) 
DEL_IND -0.128*** -0.125*** -0.124*** 
 (0.0468) (0.0474) (0.0474) 
CONS_JOB -0.133*** -0.126*** -0.126*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0212) 
MOTH -0.229*** -0.238*** -0.238*** 
 (0.0483) (0.0487) (0.0486) 
STUD_WORK 0.423*** 0.423*** 0.422*** 
 (0.0419) (0.0423) (0.0423) 
TRAINEESHIP -0.338*** -0.335*** -0.334*** 
 (0.0433) (0.0437) (0.0437) 
PHD -1.180*** -1.168*** -1.168*** 
 (0.0845) (0.0848) (0.0848) 
_cons 1.680*** 1.602*** 1.605*** 
 (0.3529) (0.3573) (0.3571) 
Field of study Yes Yes Yes 
athrho    
_cons -0.186*** -0.179*** -0.183*** 
 (0.0459) (0.0444) (0.0444) 
lnsigma    
_cons -1.015*** -1.017*** -1.018*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0154) 
N 9594 9395 9395 
Wald χ2 2158.02 2420.68 3423.37 
Robust standard error in parenthesis 
* Significant at 10% 
**Significant at 5% 
*** Significant at 1% 
 
